Global Europe

The August 2008 war in Georgia has shed a spotlight on the South Caucasus, demonstrating its strategic significance. The European Union has payed tribute to this significance with its “Eastern Partnership,” which has prioritized the three countries of the region -- Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia -- along with Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, as key “partner countries”.

Now it seems that there is another trend underway that may reshape the geopolitical map of the region not less than the August 2008 war -- this time in a much more positive way.

Armenia and Turkey are moving rapidly toward a groundbreaking agreement on normalizing relations, including a possible reopening of the long-closed Turkish-Armenian border and the establishment of diplomatic relations. Each side has moved quickly to consolidate gains in the wake of the historic visit to Armenia of Turkish president Abdullah Gul in September 2008. That visit, as the first-ever a Turkish head of state has traveled to Armenia, followed months of secret diplomacy brokered by the Swiss and paved the way for a new effort to bridge divides and overcome divisions.

As the pace of Turkish-Armenian diplomacy accelerated in recent months, with the release of two draft diplomatic “protocols” on 31 August, the Turkish and Armenian foreign ministers are now set to meet in Switzerland on 10 October for a formal signing ceremony.  Yet even with the signing of the protocols, there will be now an even more difficult test, as both sides are required to garner parliamentary ratification prior to the implementation of the normalization agreement.

For Armenia, whose authoritarian government has largely been driven toward a moderate policy toward Turkey by its “desperation” for a foreign policy success, neither public opinion nor parliamentary consideration poses any real challenge. The real challenge, and the real burden, rests with the Turkish side. It was Turkey that closed its border with Armenia in 1993 and withheld diplomatic relations in support of Azerbaijan over its war for control of Nagorno-Karabagh.  And, most crucially, it is Turkey that remains challenged by the need to face the historic legacy of the Armenian genocide.

However, the prospect of a normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations represents a strategic opportunity that Turkey may be in danger of missing -- given a recent flurry of diplomatic threats and political posturing aimed at reassuring the nationalist camps both within Turkey and in Azerbaijan.  

For Armenia, the benefits of a normalization with Turkey are clear. Open borders and normal relations are essential and stand as prerequisites to development and stability.  An agreement with Turkey would offer Armenia an immediate end to the country’s dependence on Georgia and would do much to lessen over-dependence on Russia by bringing Armenia closer to the West, while also bringing Europe closer to Armenia.

And in a strategic sense, the normalization with Turkey is an imperative for overcoming the two strategic threats now facing Armenia -- isolation and insignificance.  Of course, this process necessitates a recognition of the past, based on a mutual accommodation of the historical legacy of genocide, but also on a shared perspective of looking to the future.

If it succeeds, this agreement must be seen in the proper perspective. It represents the bare minimum of good neighbourly relations. Turkey should not be overly praised or rewarded, as such a decision would only be a first step in addressing more fundamental challenges facing Turkey -- including the Kurdish and Cyprus issues and the imperative for significantly deeper reforms. The issue of normalizing relations with Armenia also stands a key test of Turkey’s strategic future.

For the EU, an agreement between Turkey and Armenia offers several strategic opportunities.

First, it enhances regional stability by seeking to resolve disputes by diplomacy rather than force, in contrast to the deadly lesson from the Georgian war.

A second opportunity for the EU is to leverage Turkish-Armenian diplomacy to renew focus on the unresolved Nagorno-Karabagh conflict, which now stands as the last remaining “frozen” conflict in the South Caucasus.  

A third opportunity for the EU stems from the broader impact of normalizing relations with Turkey as an important mechanism to deepen democracy and bolster reform in Armenia, also offering a new path toward region reintegration and broader development once borders are opened and trade restored.  

And finally, in a larger sense, Turkey’s diplomatic engagement of Armenia may also help to advance Turkey’s quest for eventual EU membership, especially in light of Turkey’s recent launch of a new “Kurdish initiative.”