Global Europe

Norway is the EU’s closest and most reliable partner in foreign affairs and security policy, supporting EU diplomacy and contributing to EU crisis management operations and stand-by forces. And yet, it remains excluded from respective decision taking. Its influence is primarily based on informal contacts – notwithstanding political dialogue meetings – and limited to the decision shaping process.

The emphasis the EU puts on its “decision making autonomy” prevents any formal involvement of Norway in decision making procedures. Confronted with constantly fragile consensus and presuming their brothers in arms will spoil the process if only enabled to do, EU Member States are unwilling to invite their partners to the conference table.

There is value in admitting partners to participate in decisions that affect them though. The more so since the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is intergovernmental in nature. The presence of an additional party would neither change its character nor its procedures. If the EU were to compromise on its decision making autonomy, it must, however, get some tangible gain in return.

That is where the mutual assistance clause included in the Lisbon Treaty comes into play. Norway could capitalise on the EU having become a – asymmetrical, caveat burdened– defence alliance by offering to non-reciprocally commit itself to aid and assistance by all the means in its power towards an EU member state that is the victim of armed aggression on its territory.

But, what would be Norway’s benefit in signing up to succour the EU and its member states? Would it be worth the price? In exchange for incurring such a commitment, Norway were able to demand full participation – including a veto right – in some areas of CFSP and qualified participation – with speaking right but no veto – in others.

Such an arrangement would enable Norway to influence EU foreign and security policy without joining the Union and giving up its independent trade, agricultural and fisheries policies. There is no question that Oslo must be interested in having a say regarding the launch of EU operations to which it contributes as well as in shaping the EU’s Arctic, transatlantic, Russia and Middle East policies.

 This is especially so if this influence comes at a reasonable price. As NATO member, Norway is already bound to defend 21 out of 27 EU Member States. It would, thus, have to extend its security guarantees to further six states only. Sweden and Finland could count on aid and assistance from their Nordic neighbour anyway. Armed aggression by a state directed at Austria, Ireland and Malta is as unlikely as belligerence emanating from one of these countries. 

With regard to the potential deterioration of Turco-Cypriot relations, Norway’s assistance obligation had to be neutralised with a “without prejudice” caveat referring to the North Atlantic Treaty obligations. NATO commitments take preference for those EU Member States that are parties of it too. Besides, NATO remains the primary framework for their collective defence.

The terms and conditions of Oslo’s rights and obligations in the framework of the CFSP in exchange for committing to the EU’s assistance would have to be fixed in a treaty between the Union, its Member States and the Kingdom of Norway. Such an agreement requires unanimous backing of all 27 Member States though. Securing its approval will, thus, prove challenging.

That is not Norway’s fault. The Nordic country embodies the EU’s values and shows its commitment to the European project by contributing its fair share to the EU cohesion fund. By rewarding Oslo with formal involvement in the CFSP the EU could encourage a trustworthy ally to keep providing valuable personnel and capabilities to its efforts.

What makes such an arrangement contentious is the precedence it might set for other partners. Turkey would, undoubtedly albeit understandably, press for a similar agreement once the conflict on Cyprus is resolved. EU Member States that oppose Turkey’s European aspirations on principal grounds might, therefore, be inclined to veto the understanding with Norway right from the start.

Nevertheless, the EU and its Member States are well advised to design their intimate cooperation with Norway on the latter’s merits. Of course, the development of Brussels’s partnerships with Oslo and Ankara cannot be separated entirely. Norway should, however, not be taken hostage to complicated EU-Turkey relations. By signing up to succour the EU and its Member States in case of armed attack, Norway gains leverage to negotiate its participation in the CFSP. After all, it is by no means self-evident that a state non-reciprocally commits itself to defend its partners. Even if this prize looks rather symbolic given the still predominant role of NATO for the defence of European states, it is sufficiently tangible for the EU to compromise on its decision making autonomy. 

The EU not only turns a reliable partner into a staunch ally by conceding to furnish the conference table with an additional seat. It also signals to other neighbours that formal involvement in CFSP decision making is possible in principle if certain conditions are met. In order to test such an association, the EU must, however, wish that its generosity would not too swiftly convince the Norwegian public to join the Union altogether.