Global Europe

Much attention has focused recently on who will be chosen for the new jobs created by the Lisbon Treaty, the ‘permanent’ President of the European Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The gossip glosses over the realities of both posts: no matter how charismatic the post-holder, until the 27 member states can agree on what he (or she?) should say, the President or High Representative will have to remain largely silent. The Lisbon Treaty no more creates a ‘single voice’ for the Union than the Amsterdam Treaty did when it created Javier Solana’s post.

Having said that, however, the High Representative’s job is both more burdensome and potentially more powerful: under the Lisbon Treaty, the High Representative can propose EU actions, will have resources available to assist him or her (most importantly the new External Action Service), and has a mandate to encourage the member states to reach agreement. In contrast, the European Council President chairs European Council meetings and has a mandate to try to facilitate consensus in the European Council, but has less formal power to initiate action and fewer resources available to support his or her work. While both post-holders may have some wiggle room in terms of interpreting their responsibilities more broadly, both will always be constrained by the Treaty provisions, and will not be able to run ahead of their employers, the European Council and the Foreign Affairs Council, for long without being pulled back.

In addition, there is the open question of how the post-holders will relate to each other (bureaucratic politics have not been put to rest by these innovations), and how they will relate to the various European prime ministers, French president, and European foreign ministers, who, it must be remembered, have far more popular legitimacy than do the EU post-holders. It is very unlikely that a Sarkozy or a Merkel will tolerate being outshone on the ‘international stage’ by what is effectively a committee chairman. And in an international crisis, would any leader of a member state step aside in favour of the European Council president or High Representative? Again, highly unlikely.

Finally, in much of the discussion about the Lisbon Treaty, the benefits of previous treaty arrangements are forgotten. In particular, the much-maligned presidency system – often held responsible for the lack of a coherent single European voice in international affairs – has the unparalleled benefit of strengthening the links between the national and EU levels in foreign policy, and gives all the member states (even the smallest) a high profile internationally and the opportunity to include their foreign policy preferences on the EU agenda. Without that link, we could see more, not fewer, squabbles over foreign policy, as member states of all sizes seek to ensure their interests and views are taken into account.

So if the new EU post-holders are to be successful in increasing the EU’s international influence, the 27 member states have to find the unity and sense of purpose that can often elude them. We can but hope that the European Council President and High Representative spend more of their time negotiating with other international actors on behalf of the 27, than trying to knock 27 heads together to reach agreements in Brussels.