Obama’s Afghan strategy not working, says the Economist:
Since November, when Mr Obama promised 30,000 more of his country’s soldiers to the campaign, little has gone right. General McChrystal’s plan was for a “surge” that would seize the initiative from the Taliban and create the scope for Afghanistan’s government, backed by its army and police, to take charge. In practice that has not happened.
But failure is not an option:
Were so much not at stake, it would be tempting to give up and call the troops home. Yet, although Western leaders have done a poor job at explaining the war in Afghanistan to their voters, a defeat there would be a disaster. The narrow aim of denying al-Qaeda a haven, already frustrated by the terrorists’ scope to lodge in unruly parts of northern Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, would become impossible to achieve. A Western withdrawal would leave Afghanistan vulnerable to a civil war that might suck in the local powers, including Iran, Pakistan, India and Russia. Sooner or later, the poison would end up harming America too: it always does. Defeat in Afghanistan would mark a humiliation for the West, and for NATO, that would give succour to its foes in the world. And do not forget the Afghan people. Having invaded their country, the West has a duty to return it to them in a half-decent state.
In the Financial Times, Ahmed Rashid says the military strategy in Afghanistan is “failing”.
Much has been made of President Hamid Karzai’s erratic and self-serving style of ruling, especially given last year’s rigged presidential election and the corruption and poor governance of which he is often accused.
What is less well known is the dysfunctional nature of Mr Obama’s team. Since they were appointed, the senior officials who decide US policy in the region have been at loggerheads. The White House has failed to consult Richard Holbrooke, the state department’s special representative to the region. In Kabul, Gen McChrystal and retired General Karl Eikenberry, the US ambassador, have at times barely been on speaking terms. In turn, Gen Eikenberry and Ann Patterson, the US ambassador to Pakistan, have had sharp differences with Mr Holbrooke.
In the Pentagon, there have been acute differences between the generals on policy and policy towards Afghanistan’s and Pakistan’s civilian leaders. The burning issue below the surface has been the generals’ reluctance to accept Mr Obama’s time-line – the start of a US withdrawal from Afghanistan in July 2011. As one US military officer told me: “You don’t fight an insurgency by the clock.”
The underlying differences are well-known to Afghan and Pakistani leaders, who have tried to exploit them. They are equally familiar to Nato officials, who wonder why Mr Obama has not resolved them earlier. (…)
The real crisis, however, is that the US-Nato strategy in southern Afghanistan has barely made a dent in the Taliban’s resistance, which is spreading across the country. Nato’s offensive in Marjah, in Helmand, is five months old and still has not secured the area. The anticipated surge to secure Kandahar province has been postponed due to the Taliban’s penetration of the region. Seventy-nine Nato soldiers have been killed in June so far – the highest monthly figure since the war began.
Mr Karzai wants to talk to the Taliban not fight them. The Europeans have also been urging the Americans to start negotiations, so a political solution can be found before the start of the drawdown. But Mr Obama’s aides insist the Taliban must first be dealt a military blow.
That may not be possible, so a political strategy must now be paramount. The Taliban leadership has let it be known it wants to talk to the Americans. Many Afghans also want Washington’s participation in the talks, so the US can be a fire-break, ensuring Mr Karzai does not make too many concessions, and preventing neighbours such as Pakistan from imposing conditions upon Kabul.
The military strategy must be subservient to this new political process. Instead of going for the hardest killing fields first – Kandahar and Helmand – US and Nato forces should focus on more achievable objectives, such as governance and economic development. (…)
Gen McChrystal’s counter-insurgency strategy no doubt reaped dividends such as reducing casualties and winning hearts and minds. But a military strategy rooted in political dialogue, and which takes on easier goals first, is more likely to gain support from the Afghans and regional countries, and enable western troops to stay longer if necessary. The alternative is a deeper chaos.
Gilles Dorronsoro (Carnegie) says, in the New York Times, that a “more realistic approach” is needed:
Progress in Marja is elusive and gains are unlikely to materialize for several years, after the United States is scheduled to begin the draw down of its forces. For Kandahar, the coalition wisely abandoned plans for a major military offensive that were doomed to be a disaster. But with low levels of support for the local government and high levels of corruption, there is virtually no chance for success in the area.
Given the reality on the ground, there is little hope for reversing the situation in Afghanistan over the next 12 to 18 months. The Taliban continue to gain strength and it is unrealistic to try to weaken them before beginning negotiations.
The new U.S. leadership has a chance to design and carry out a more realistic approach. General Petraeus should scale down the current offensive and limit the coalition’s mounting casualties — these casualties only put more pressure on the United States and its allies to withdraw quickly.
Negotiations with the Taliban should begin this winter after the coalition offers a cease fire. As the negotiations move ahead, the United States needs to assume a leadership position as the current Afghan government cannot be trusted to defend the interests of the international community.
Anthony Cordesman (CSIS) is, in a larger analysis of the Afghan war, deeply sceptical:
Two critical questions dominate any realistic discussion of the conflict. The first is whether the war is worth fighting. The second is whether it can be won. The answers to both questions are uncertain.
The Washington Post’s David Ignatius, however, is more upbeat: “Gen. David Petraeus didn’t sign on as the new Afghanistan commander because he expects to lose.”
Belarus-Russia relations to remain tense. The gas dispute has been settled, but this “will not be the last spat” between Russia and Belarus, the Economist says:
Last year the Belarusian president refused to recognise the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the two breakaway Georgian territories over which Russia had warred with Georgia. That was followed by a Russian ban on Belarus’s milk products. More recently, Mr Lukashenka has decided to shelter Kurmanbek Bakiyev, the overthrown authoritarian leader of Kyrgyzstan, who is loathed by Moscow.
Mr Lukashenka has also sabotaged the customs union with Kazakhstan and Russia, demanding that Russia scrap its export duty on oil and oil products, which would allow Belarus to buy them at Russia’s domestic prices and to re-export them at a profit. (Russia wants to keep oil out of the union for now.) Russia’s response is to reach for its favourite weapon: the gas taps.
Iceland’s entry into the EU “is anything but guaranteed”, says the FT’s Tony Barber, after spending three days in the country:
I have met government ministers and officials who are eager to steer their country into the EU. But I have met a fairly wide range of private sector businessmen, teachers, students and other Icelanders who are either flatly opposed or at best non-committed.
Sri Lanka rejects trade vs human rights deal with EU. AFP reports:
Sri Lanka Thursday trashed “insulting” EU demands that it make a written undertaking to improve its human rights record in exchange for trade benefits.
Government spokesman Keheliya Rambukwella said Colombo also rejected a July 1 deadline issued by the European Union to agree to a host of other conditions to qualify for preferential trade tariffs. “These conditions are unacceptable. They are an insult to every citizen of this country,” Rambukwella told reporters in Colombo. “We must put the EU demand in the dustbin.”
He said the EU conditions affected internal security. The 27-nation bloc wanted Sri Lanka to relax some of the provisions of its draconian Prevention of Terrorism law, which was not possible, he added.
The EU’s executive arm, the European Commission, has insisted on “significant improvements on the effective implementation of the human rights conventions” for the island to continue enjoying the trade benefits.
The EU trade scheme gives 16 poor nations preferential access to the vast European market in return for following strict commitments on a variety of social and rights issues.
These benefits will be withdrawn on August 15 unless Sri Lanka makes a written commitment by July 1, according to the EU.
EU-China. Until recently European leaders visiting China felt obliged to speak out on human rights, but not anymore, says the Economist’s Charlemagne:
Europe has “moved way beyond trying to persuade China to accept our values,” a veteran diplomat admits. The goal has changed from making China a “responsible stakeholder” to “we are not quite sure what.” Yet Chinese envoys and semi-official scholars who tour European capitals complain that a declining Europe still wants to impose its values. Europe’s ex-colonial powers are ill-placed to lecture China about its behaviour in Africa, they say. And as for governance inside China, the Communist Party rejects Europe’s individualistic view of human rights: the priority is lifting millions from poverty and ensuring stability. What is more, they conclude, ordinary Chinese share such views.
European Parliament President Jerzy Buzek, however, yesterday told the Human Rights Subcommittee that on his recent China visit he talked with the Chinese leadership extensively on human rights. From the press release:
Acknowledging the need to engage with China on the most pressing global challenges, Mr Buzek said “When we talk to the Chinese and we talk
about matters of such great importance as climate change, the fight against terrorism, nuclear weapons, economic and financial crisis, whenever we do this we have to remember about the human rights issues.”
Referring to his discussion with Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, Mr Buzek said “We talked at length about human rights issues, about democracy and the rule of law and I appreciated his openness and his listening to my message. I told him we appreciate the fact that he keeps an open mind and listens to the European approach.”
Barroso and Van Rompuy. The New York Times has a profile of the couple on the top of the EU. Both are attending today’s G8 and Sunday’s G20 meeting in Canada on behalf of the EU.
US back in global leadership position. David Ignatius writes:
As the Group of 20 prepares for its economic summit this weekend in Toronto, the mood is one that would have surprised many observers a year ago: The United States is once again in the driver’s seat on global economic policy, with China emerging as a potent partner.
From the think tanks. Vasilis Margaras, Common Security and Defence Policy and the Lisbon Treaty Fudge: No common strategic culture, no major progress. CEPS, here — Is Europe’s energy security policy a reality or an ambition? Conference summary. Security & Defence Agenda, here — Sabine Fischer, Pavol Demes, To Engage or Not to Engage: The Policy Dilemma of Dealing with Belarus. GMF, here.
To sign up for the Global Europe Morning Brief, please send an email to globeurope@gmail